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I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Rahl's international antitrust challenge' is a first-class,
pocket-sized introduction to a debate that has run for decades and yet
shows no signs of exhaustion. The piece echoes many of the themes of
Professor Rahl's important 1974 Cornell article,2 while bringing new
freshness and vigor to the problem. His challenge demonstrates, in a few
simple pages, that the scores of books and hundreds of articles of the last
fifteen years have still not resolved key policy questions on the role of
national antitrust laws in international commerce.
This Article cannot hope to address all facets of Professor Rahl's
challenge. Instead, it will briefly discuss his implied criticism of the
United States' decision not to apply its antitrust laws to its export com-
merce. Other nations, in their own way, follow a similar policy, but ad-
mittedly that does not explain the U.S. position. While generally an
outspoken proponent of antitrust principles, the United States for de-
cades has exempted registered export cartels from its antitrust reach,3
and indeed this approach was updated by Congress in the Export Trad-
ing Company Act of 1982.4 Another part of that same 1982 legislation,
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, generally exempted all
* Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.; A.B., Yale College, 1966; J.D., Stanford University,
1969.
I See Professor Rahl's An International Antitrust Challenge, which begins this Symposium.
2 Rahl, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What Is Covered?, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1
(1974).
3 The Webb-Pomerene Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1982).
4 The Export Trading Company Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4021 (1982).
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export-oriented conduct from Sherman Act scrutiny, whether or not reg-
istered with the government.' Given the vigor of U.S. antitrust enforce-
ment in both domestic and import commerce, what is the justification for
the United States' "two-faced policies" 6 that gleefully permit anticompe-
titive export conduct?
In the tradition of the common law, this article will approach this
issue from the ground up by analyzing the facts of a few recent cases.
While these cases differ from one to the other, in each instance either a
U.S. court or a U.S. government agency concluded that U.S. export con-
duct should not be subjected to antitrust attack. These decisions were
not grounded in crude mercantilism. Instead, they are defensible on
more neutral and legitimate grounds. Moreover, these cases help show
that the exemption of export conduct is not two-faced, even for a coun-
try dedicated to international competition. They demonstrate, rather,
that it is entirely proper to accord national antitrust laws only a limited
role in promoting international competition.
II. MCGLINCHY V. SHELL CHEMICAL CO.
McGlinchy v. Shell ChemicalCo.7 is one of the first appellate deci-
sions to construe the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act. Ac-
cording to the plaintiffs, Shell had agreed to appoint Mr. McGlinchy and
Dande Products as Shell's representatives to market polybutylene ("PB")
pipe resin in Southeast Asia. Apparently the resin was to be exported
from the United States. The plaintiffs alleged that, as part of a conspir-
acy in restraint of trade and monopolization attempt, Shell terminated
the appointments. The background for the terminations is not explained
in either the district court decision8 or court of appeals decision, and the
plaintiffs' complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim. Thus, one
may assume the most lurid motivations-that Shell acted pursuant to a
cartel agreement of international PB producers seeking to control the
supply and prices of PB resin into, for example, Indonesia. The plaintiffs
alleged that they had used their appointments to locate, develop, and
promote Asian companies to use PB resin, and that the effect of the ter-
minations was to injure those companies and consumers in Indonesia and
elsewhere.9
The U.S. courts were unmoved by these allegations. Whatever anti-
5 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982).
6 See Rahl, supra note 1.
7 McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1988).
8 McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,672 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
9 McGlinchy, 845 F.2d at 815.
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competitive effects there were,1 ° they impacted only foreign interests.
Both the district court and court of appeals walked through the language
of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act 1 and found the chal-
lenged conduct exempt from Sherman Act attack. There was no allega-
tion of harm to U.S. consumers or to any company seeking to export
from the United States in competition with Shell. Absent one or the
other U.S. domestic effect, the conduct was outside the Sherman Act's
jurisdiction, notwithstanding that U.S. exports were involved and that
Shell was a U.S. corporation."z
This result should not be criticized as narrow-minded mercantilism
showing no sensitivity to the benefits that competition can bring to world
economies. First, a court in the United States would have questionable
competence to adjudicate on competitive conditions in Indonesia and on
the impact of Shell's actions on Indonesian consumers or Indonesian
businesses. One would have to have extraordinary faith in the U.S. dis-
covery and trial procedures to reach an opposite conclusion, particularly
where a jury trial would govern. Second, if there really was harm to
Indonesian competitive interests, the Indonesian government would be
the logical one to take action. If Indonesia has an antitrust law to ad-
dress such problems, the U.S. legal system should not interfere, and if
Indonesia has not seen fit to adopt antitrust regulations for its economy,
the United States should not second-guess that decision of a sovereign
power.
In this particular example, any Indonesian effort to enforce its own
competition laws would not have been hampered by problems of personal
jurisdiction or the practical enforceability of a judgment. This is because
the Shell group has significant operations in Indonesia. Even if the facts
were different, however, the mechanisms of international judicial assist-
10 Both the district court and court of appeals were skeptical that the plaintiffs had alleged any
adverse effects on competition, as opposed to adverse effects only on the plaintiffs' particular busi-
nesses. McGlinchy, 1985-2 Trade Cas. at 63,169; McGlinchy, 845 F.2d at 815.
11 That language is cumbersome, but nonetheless clear in its basic intent:
Sections I to 7 of this title [the Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or
commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import
trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such
trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of this title, other
than this section.
If sections I to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of the operation of paragraph
I(B), then sections I to 7 of this title shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export
business in the United States.
15 U.S.C. § 6a.
12 McGlinchy, 1985-2 Trade Cas. at 63,168-69; McGlinchy, 845 F.2d at 814-15.
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ance (e.g., extradition, service-of-process conventions, and enforcement
of foreign judgments) could be made available to the Indonesian enforce-
ment agencies and courts to bring any evader of jurisdiction to justice. A
constructive role for the United States, and for other competitively
minded countries, would be to assist Indonesia in that country's applica-
tion of its own laws. This approach would be more orderly than one in
which the United States applied its own laws to advance U.S. perceptions
of what would be good for Indonesia.
III. IN' PORTERS S.A. v. HANES PRINTABLES, INC
The 'In'Porters, S.A. v. Hanes Printables, Inc.13 case also involved a
suit by a foreign distributor who had been terminated by an American
exporter. 'In' Porters, a French company, had distributed clothing in
France for a number of U.S. manufacturers. The defendant, Hanes, al-
legedly induced 'In' Porters to terminate its relationships with other U.S.
companies and act exclusively for Hanes. Later, Hanes itself terminated
'In' Porters, and the plaintiff brought suit. Unlike in McGlinchy, the
plaintiff in 'In' Porters could claim an adverse competitive effect not only
abroad (in France, its distribution territory), but also in U.S. export com-
merce. This was because Hanes had allegedly induced 'In' Porters to
cease its distribution of competitive U.S. products in France.
As in McGlinchy, however, the court dismissed the antitrust claim
under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act. The plaintiff's
operations were wholly in France, and insofar as the plaintiff was injured,
the suit did not involve injury to U.S. commerce. The plaintiff's allega-
tion of injury to other parties in U.S. commerce (the U.S. exporters who
lost a distribution channel in France) was of no avail:
A foreign company that demonstrates the requisite effect on the United
States export trade, but fails to establish that it is within the class of injured
United States exporters, lacks a jurisdictional basis to sue under the Sher-
man Act. In other words, a foreign company can not demonstrate the do-
mestic injury requirement by "piggybacking" onto the injury of a United
States exporter.' 4
The In'Porters court correctly applied the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act, and it reached a sensible result as well. Where, as in
McGlinchy, the alleged harm to competition impacted only foreign inter-
ests, Congress saw no reason for the application of U.S. law. Where, as
in 'In' Porters, the alleged harm to competition impacted both foreign
13 'In' Porters, S.A. v. Hanes Printables, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 494 (M.D.N.C. 1987).
14 Id. at 500 (citing Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.
1984)).
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interests and U.S. exporters, Congress intended U.S. law to apply only if
and to the extent a claim is made by the U.S. exporters themselves. In
the words of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, the Sher-
man Act is to apply to the challenged conduct "only for injury to export
business in the United States,"15 meaning that any harmed U.S. export-
ers have standing to sue, but not foreign companies whose interests are
not within the protective scope of U.S. law. 6
One of the rationales for this limited application of U.S. law was
explained by the "In'Porters court as a desire to avoid handicapping U.S.
businesses in their export trade:
Congress enacted the Export Act in response to complaints from American
firms that the antitrust laws impaired their ability to increase exports
through aggressive competition or cooperation.... Congress sought to place
American-owned companies operating entirely abroad or in United States
export trade on equal footing with their foreign-owned competitors by free-
ing them from the possibility of dual and conflicting antitrust regulation.
... [N]o longer is there any possibility that, because of uncertainty growing
out of American ownership, such firms will be subject to a different and
perhaps stricter regimen of antitrust than their competitors of foreign
ownership. 17
To be sure, blaming the U.S. trade deficit on U.S. antitrust laws is
not very plausible as a general proposition. From a U.S. policy per-
spective, however, a French distributor should not have greater rights,
through the unique remedy of treble-damage litigation in a U.S. court, to
regulate the affairs of its U.S. supplier than it has to regulate the affairs of
its Italian or Brazilian supplier. There can be no doubt that permitting a
15 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
16 The legislative history is clear on this point:
If such solely export-oriented conduct affects export commerce of another person doing busi-
ness in the United States, both the Sherman Act and FTC Act amendments preserve jurisdic-
tion insofar as there is injury to that person. Thus, a domestic exporter is assured a remedy
under our antitrust laws for injury caused by unlawful conduct of a competing United States
exporter. But a foreign firm whose non-domestic operations were injured by the very same
export oriented conduct would have no remedy under our laws.
H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 2431, 2495.
Congress was not wholly consistent in applying this approach, for the 1982 legislation allows
both domestic and foreign plaintiffs to sue where the challenged conduct is subject to U.S. jurisdic-
tion because of an adverse impact on domestic or import commerce, rather than just on export
commerce. Id. at 10, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2495; 15 U.S.C. § 6a(l)(A). This
result is faithful to a degree to some language in Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978), but it is
nevertheless dubious policy. See 2 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN
BusiNEss ABROAD § 14.26 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter ATWOOD & BREWSTER].
17 McGlinchy, 663 F. Supp. at 498 (citations omitted). The first internal quote is from Eurim-
Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1102, 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), and the second is from H.R.
REP. No. 686, supra note 16, at 10, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2495.
18 See generally, 2 ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 16, ch. 17.
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suit such as 'In' Porters would subject U.S. exporters to greater legal risk
and less business freedom than is faced by their foreign competitors. In
the absence of strong countervailing policy considerations, this would
hardly be good policy from the standpoint of the United States. 19
IV. NATIONAL MACHINE TOOL BUILDERS' ASSOCIATION
The third case involves a different part of the 1982 legislation, the
Export Trading Company Act ("ETCA"). 20 Specifically, Title III of the
ETCA establishes an administrative mechanism by which U.S. compa-
nies can obtain clearance from the Departments of Commerce and Jus-
tice. If those agencies conclude that the proposed export activities are
not likely to adversely affect U.S. competitive interests, the Secretary of
Commerce will issue a "certificate of review" granting broad antitrust
protection. These agencies have issued well over one hundred certificates
under the program.21
A certificate recently issued to the National Machine Tool Builders'
Association ("NMTBA") illustrates the potential of the ETCA con-
cept.22 In its application,23 the NMTBA explained that it was a national
trade association representing more than 260 machine tool builders who
accounted for between 60 and 65% of U.S. machine tool production.
Sales of machine tools in the United States were in excess of $2 billion,
and export sales were in excess of $375 million. Nevertheless, the
machine tool industry in the United States was severely depressed due to
a combination of factors, including a shrinking domestic market, greatly
increased imports, and a heightening of competition in export markets
traditionally dominated by U.S. firms. 24 The NMTBA maintained that
19 As 'In' Porters suggests, and as the 1982 legislation makes clear, if an American exporter's
conduct is unreasonably restraining the trade of other U.S. exporters, those exporters do have a
claim under U.S. law. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)(B). Nor is this right available only to U.S. firms or U.S.
nationals; any person engaged in U.S. export trade, regardless of nationality, may assert such rights.
20 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-21.
21 For further description of the program, see, e.g., Department of Justice, Antitrust Enforce-
ment Guidelines for International Operations § 2.6, 53 Fed. Reg. 21,584 (Nov. 10, 1988); 1 ATWOOD
& BREWSTER, supra note 16, § 9.46A (1988 Supp.); Lewis, Title III of the Export Trading Company
Act: A Case Study in Interagency Coordination to Promote Exports, 5 U. PITT. J.L. & COMM. 451
(1985). Pertinent regulations, forms, and a bibliography can be found in DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
EXPORT TRADING COMPANIES: A HANDBOOK FOR PROFESSIONALS (1985).
22 Export Trade Certificate of Review for National Machine Tool Builders' Association, No. 87-
00004 (May 19, 1987), summarized at 52 Fed. Reg. 19,371 (1987)[hereinafter National Machine
Tool Certificate]. The author acted as counsel to NMTBA with respect to this certificate.
23 NMTBA Application for an Export Trade Certificate of Review (Feb. 17, 1987)[hereinafter
NMTBA Application].
24 For example, total U.S. machine tool exports declined overall from $924.1 million in 1981 to
$387.2 million in 1985. Id., Item 15, at 2.
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an export certificate would enable its members to compete more effec-
tively in foreign markets by allowing, for example, the sharing of market
intelligence, the formation of bidding consortia on large turn-key
projects, and the joint promotion of U.S. products abroad.
After reviewing the evidence, the Secretary of Commerce granted
the NMTBA an export certificate, broadly authorizing the association's
members to coordinate their export activities as they saw fit, subject only
to safeguards to prevent domestic "spillover" effects. Many of the au-
thorized activities, such as the joining of small companies with comple-
mentary product lines to enable them to submit a joint bid on a large
foreign contract, probably would have passed scrutiny under a rule of
reason test even without certification. Other permitted activities, how-
ever, unquestionably fell within traditional areas of antitrust prohibition,
such as price fixing, market allocations, and boycotts.
In granting export certificates such as this one, the United States is
not acting as an international competitive outlaw. As already suggested,
neither the United States nor any other government is well equipped to
anticipate and protect the competitive interests of other countries. Addi-
tionally, by applying U.S. antitrust laws to conduct having adverse effects
only on foreign markets, the United States would in many instances be
limiting the business freedom of U.S. exporters to a degree well beyond
what the law of the targeted foreign markets would require. Further-
more, export cooperation, particularly among small firms, can often be
pro-competitive, because it allows the spreading of the risks and cosfs of
overseas endeavors. Thus, even from the perspective of the export mar-
kets being targeted, an exemption from U.S. antitrust laws will often be a
good thing.
Moreover, the U.S. export certification program is not designed to
protect certificate holders from the consequences of foreign law. The
NMTBA certificate, like all others issued under the program, contains an
explicit disclaimer to that effect.25 Further proof of the intentions of the
United States on this point can be found in the record of the Wood
Pulp26 case recently decided by the European Court of Justice. There,
the Court held that the European Economic Community ("EEC") anti-
25 The issuance of this certificate of review to NMTBA by the United States Government
under the provisions of the [Export Trading Company] Act does not constitute, explicitly or
implicitly, an endorsement or opinion of the United States Government concerning either (a)
the viability or quality of the business plans of NMTBA or its Members under the laws of the
United States (other than as provided in the Act) or (b) the legality of such business plans of
NMTBA or its Members under the laws of any foreign country.
National Machine Tool Certificate, supra note 22 (emphasis added).
26 A. Ahlstrdm Osakeyhiti6 v. Commission, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 114, 491 (Sept. 27,
1988)[hereinafter Wood Pulp].
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trust authorities had jurisdiction over the pricing activities of a U.S.
Webb-Pomerene export association. Webb-Pomerene associations were
the precursors of the export trade associations now being formed under
the 1982 legislation. The European Court specifically noted that the
Webb-Pomerene Act,27 like the Export Trading Company Act, "merely
exempts the conclusion of export cartels from the application of United
States antitrust laws but does not require such cartels to be concluded."
In addition, "it should further be pointed out that the United States au-
thorities raised no objection regarding any conflict of jurisdiction when
consulted by the [EEC] Commission" about its antitrust investigation of
the American group.28
Indeed, I would argue that steps by the United States to limit the
reach of its antitrust laws will encourage foreign governments to
strengthen theirs. This should be true, at least, if the United States con-
tinues to support international cooperation and judicial assistance when a
trading partner is seeking to apply its law to its own import commerce. I
have previously debated Professor Rahl on this point as follows:
A redefinition of American substantive antitrust goals to exclude foreign
restraints could be seriously resented if it were thought that the United
States is also trying to promote American export cartels and to protect
them from foreign prosecution. That would only encourage foreign govern-
ments to resist the application of American law to their firms. Thus our
recommendation that the voluntary export restraint be clearly removed
from the scope of American law is not intended as an endorsement of ex-
ploitation abroad. We do think it will have the effect of increasing the pres-
ence and profitability of American business abroad. But if the
arrangements among American firms, or between American and foreign
firms, unduly restrain trade in foreign markets, then foreign governments
will have every right to call their antitrust laws into play and to expect that
the United States should be able to expect similar treatment in the reverse
situation.
Professor James Rahl has argued that this enforcement pattern has
things exactly in reverse: American law should stop export restraints on
United States territory where they occur, and foreign regimes should do the
same to protect American markets. 29 Local rather than extraterritorial en-
forcement, after all, reduces the problems of proof, jurisdiction, and the
27 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66.
28 Wood Pulp, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. at 18,612.
The legislative history of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act similarly evidences
that the United States is not seeking to protect its export cartels from the application of foreign laws:
[T]he Committee recognized the increased sensitivity of other nations to antitrust considera-
tions and cartel activity. By more precisely defining the subject matter jurisdiction of U.S.
antitrust law, H.R. 5235 in no way limits the ability of a foreign sovereign to act under its own
laws against an American-based export cartel having unlawful effects in its territory.
H.R. REP. No. 686, supra note 16, at 13-14, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2498-99.
29 Rahl, A Rejoinder, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 42, 43-44 (1974).
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enforcement of decrees. But it is unrealistic to rely on foreign antitrust
officials to take action against their own firms, perhaps politically powerful,
in aid of American consumers. Similar inhibitions may affect American
prosecutors as well, and some courts and juries may also find it puzzling
that United States law should be applied against Americans to help foreign-
ers whose governments have shown no enforcement interest. In our judg-
ment, the best chance for consistent and rational development of the law is
for each nation to look after its own interests, and yet to recognize at the
same time a mutual interest in the development of sound, reciprocal judicial
assistance on discovery and judgment enforcement.3 0
Congress seemed to endorse this view when it enacted the export trading
company legislation.3"
V. CONCLUSION
To be sure, there are problems both in applying national antitrust
laws to import commerce, and in enhanced international judicial assist-
ance. It may well be that a good number of international competition
disputes will have to be treated under national trade laws or through
government-to-government negotiations, rather than as matters for anti-
trust litigation.3 2 I remain skeptical, however, that the solution to Pro-
fessor Rahl's challenge lies in stronger U.S. antitrust scrutiny of its own
export trade. The solution, if one exists, lies elsewhere.
30 2 ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 16, at § 18.16.
31 See, eg, H.R. REP. No. 686, supra note 16, at 14, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2499
("Indeed, the clarified reach of our own laws could encourage our trading partners to take more
effective steps to protect competition in their markets," citing my testimony on that point).
32 See, Atwood, Conflicts of Jurisdiction: The Example of Export Cartels, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 153 (1987).
